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ABSTRACT—The practical disappearance of the jury trial ranks among the 
most widely examined topics in American criminal justice. But, by 
focusing on trial scarcity, scholars have managed to tell only part of the 
story. The unexplored first-order question is whether juries even do their 
work well. And the answer to that question turns on the kinds of work jury 
members are typically required to do. Once upon a time, trials turned upon 
practical reasoning and general moral blameworthiness. Modern trials have 
come to focus upon legal reasoning and technical guilt accuracy. In turn, 
the jury has evolved from a flexible body to a rule-bound institution. But, 
of course, even as trials have changed, laypeople’s capacities have stayed 
largely the same. Laypeople remain more skilled at the art of equitable 
evaluation than the science of legal analysis. 
It does not follow, however, that the criminal justice system should 
revert to equitable trial practices. The modern trial is professional and 
legalistic for good reason. The rule of law commands that criminal 
convictions be products of precisely drawn criminal codes and formal 
processes. Nevertheless, there are other procedural stages—arrest, charge, 
bail, bargain, and sentence—where equitable discretion is more 
appropriate. These are the stages at which criminal justice should 
concentrate lay efforts.  
In this Symposium Essay, I describe the historical and constitutional 
trends that have entrenched popular participation in all the wrong places. 
And I propose redirecting jury practice from criminal trials to other 
adjudicatory sites. Finally, I make the case that my reforms are consistent 
with (and perhaps even integral to) the legality principle, properly 
considered. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The hallmark of the American jury trial is popular participation. The 
lay jury has long been celebrated as a lay buffer against the “arbitrary 
action[s]” of legal professionals—“against the corrupt or overzealous 
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”1 But there 
is some reason to believe that the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right could, 
in fact, undermine meaningful popular participation in American criminal 
justice. Indeed, a number of prominent plea bargaining critics have offered 
a version of this claim.2 They maintain that the contemporary jury trial is 
just too costly to scale. As Albert Alschuler colorfully observed almost 
forty years ago: “Here we have an elaborate jury trial system, and only 
10% of the accused get to use it . . . . That’s like solving America’s 
transportation problems by giving 10% [of drivers] Cadillacs and making 
the rest go barefoot.”3 In the decades since Alschuler uttered those words, 
the problem has grown only worse. As of 2006, jury trial rates for felony 
offenders in state court had flattened out in the low single digits.4 
I remain somewhat hesitant to sacrifice hard-fought procedural 
protections in favor of some fictionalized historical ideal.5 Modern 
evidentiary rules are important. And the right to counsel is indispensable. 
1 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
2 “Albert Alschuler and Stephen Schulhofer have expressed support for the so-called ‘Philly 
model’” that couples a ban on bargaining with stripped-down bench trials to lesser charges. Josh 
Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319, 358 n.168 
(2012); see Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652 (1981); 
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984). John Langbein 
has expressed support for the kinds of informal jury trials that typified common law criminal justice. 
John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 21 (1978) (proposing an 
inquisitorial “streamlined . . . procedure” as “a middle path between the impossible system of routine 
adversary jury trial and the disgraceful nontrial system of plea bargaining”). 
3 Is Plea Bargaining a Cop-Out?, TIME, Aug. 1978, at 44 (quoting Albert Alschuler). 
4 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL 
TABLES 24 (2009), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf [https://perma.cc/MP8L-E4KB] 
(noting that just 4% of felony offenders “were found guilty by a jury”). 
5 Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 358–59. 
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Nevertheless, it does seem that the full-dress jury trial, which Justice 
Antonin Scalia once termed the “exorbitant gold standard of American 
justice,” is just that—exorbitant.6 All the same, my immediate claim is 
somewhat different. I intend to put to one side the question of whether we 
can afford the “gold standard” to ask whether, in the first instance, the full-
dress jury trial even is the gold standard. It might not be. 
I do not mean to question the virtue or value of popular participation. 
To the contrary, I am at least a reluctant proponent of criminal justice 
reforms designed to promote democratic experimentalism and localism.7 
But I worry that we have lost track of which questions lay bodies are best 
equipped to consider and answer. Succinctly, they are particularly well 
suited to evaluate the moral (and even prudential) questions of when and 
whether it is equitably appropriate to arrest, charge, brand, and punish.8 
They are comparatively worse at analyzing and applying formal legal tests.9 
Here, I use the terms “evaluate” and “analyze” quite consciously. As 
applied to criminal justice, the art of equitable evaluation is constructive. It 
demands particularistic attention—a qualitative effort to contextualize the 
offense and the purported offender. The layperson strives to understand the 
whole story affectively—to use her everyday wisdom to reach sensible 
determinations in light of the circumstances.10 The science of legal analysis, 
by contrast, is deconstructive and rule-bound. The professional breaks legal 
tests down to their constituent parts—or elements—and determines 
whether the evidence proves each element according to the prevailing 
burden of proof.11  
Of course, the lines between the two crafts may blur. For example, an 
adjudicator cannot determine whether a particular defendant acted 
negligently or recklessly without first making a normative determination 
about the appropriate standard of conduct or care.12 But, generally 
6 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 186 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Bowers, Normative 
Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 358–59. 
7 See, e.g., Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 331; Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea 
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85 (2007); infra notes 68–83 and accompanying text (discussing where 
and when I welcome popular participation in criminal justice). 
8 Infra notes 42–67 and accompanying text. 
9 Infra notes 68–74 and accompanying text. 
10 Infra notes 22–29, 48–52, 59–67 and accompanying text. 
11 Infra notes 30–39, 68–73 and accompanying text. 
12 See Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point 
of a “Pointless Indignity,” 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1019–21 (2014); see also LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND 
JURY 184 (1930) (“[T]here is no method of ascertaining in advance whether conduct is negligent or 
non-negligent. . . . As an element of legal responsibility it is at large, and defies the efforts of legal 
scientists to bring it under more definite control.”); Roscoe Pound, Survey of the Conference Problems, 
14 U. CIN. L. REV. 324, 332 (1940) (“The law cannot tell us exactly what is an unreasonable risk of 
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speaking, there are procedural stages that demand somewhat more 
evaluation and procedural stages that demand somewhat more analysis. 
And the dominant conception of the legality principle, as it applies to 
criminal justice, commands a high level of analytic exactness on questions 
of statutory guilt—what I will call legal guilt. This contemporary emphasis 
on formalism finds expression, most notably, in the constitutional 
prohibition against vague statutes. But it may be found elsewhere, as well. 
Juries are commanded to follow precise legal instructions. And modern 
mens rea standards are given meanings more thoroughly defined than 
abstract historical culpability concepts, like malice and moral 
blameworthiness. These substantive and procedural rules and standards are 
designed to promote rule of law values—like consistency, coherence, and 
predictability.13  
Elsewhere, I have criticized the dominant conception of legality as an 
unwarranted form of rule fetishism.14 But formalism has its place. And, for 
better or worse, the criminal justice system has made the trial the principal 
place for formalism.15 But trials are not the only meaningful stages of 
criminal justice. Cases are shaped and fates may be sealed by decisions to 
arrest, charge, set bail, and sentence. These decisions permissibly may 
remain relatively flexible. But significantly, these are also the very 
decisions that, constitutionally, have been left almost entirely to 
professionals. There are narrow exceptions. The capital sentencing jury 
comes to mind, for instance. But noncapital discretionary jury sentencing is 
almost nonexistent. And, even though grand juries are comparatively 
widespread, their ability to exercise qualitative oversight—what I have 
called “equitable discretion”—has contracted in lockstep with 
contemporary jury practice.16 In both jury contexts, authorized lay 
opportunities to evaluate cases contextually have been replaced by fixed 
procedures and structured law, dictated from on high.17 Simply put, moral 
and prudential questions are professional questions only. If lay bodies are 
injury. It is unreasonable to define the reasonable. The reasonable depends on circumstances, and times 
and places . . . .”). 
13 Infra notes 30–37 and accompanying text. 
14 Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 12; Josh Bowers, Annoy No Cop, 166 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (on file with author). 
15 Infra notes 68–74 and accompanying text (arguing that it may be appropriate to keep trials 
comparatively rule-bound). 
16 Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2010); infra notes 22–34, 95 and accompanying text (describing historical 
and current jury practices). 
17 Infra notes 22–37 and accompanying text. 
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consulted at all, it is often merely to rubberstamp technical legal 
determinations.18  
This is an unfortunate turn of events. Especially when it comes to 
equitable questions of moral blameworthiness, laypeople are experts—
competent to reach determinations uncolored by certain problematic 
institutional incentives and cognitive biases of the kind that may plague the 
repeat player.19 My premise, then, is that the Sixth Amendment has 
enshrined popular participation in the wrong place and as to the wrong set 
of questions. By historical accident, the Constitution has locked laypeople 
into the very roles they are least equipped to play—formalistic roles. 
I favor lay bodies for their competency, not their legitimacy. On this 
reading, the principal virtue of popular participation is grounded less in 
democratic theory than moral particularism.20 Lay bodies are to be prized 
for what they do, not who they are. They are means to the end of equitable 
discretion, appropriately exercised. If I am right, then we would be wise to 
get juries out of the business of analyzing legal guilt and into the business 
of evaluating normative guilt and other relevant moral and prudential 
considerations. In other words, we should want to move juries from the 
trial stage to the stages of arrest, bail, charge, bargain, and sentence. And 
we might even choose to export these normative juries to the very kinds of 
cases and crimes about which moral minds tend to differ—mala prohibita 
misdemeanors and other public order offenses.21 
In Part I, I briefly trace and comment upon the historical development 
of the jury. In Part II, I examine the need for (and exceptional ability of) 
laypeople to exercise equitable discretion. Finally, in Part III, I revisit and 
18 Infra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
19 As I argued previously: 
[The criminal justice professional] is the administrative and legal expert and ought to be 
empowered to exercise significant discretion within these domains. But she has no special claim 
against lay people to the evaluative art of equitable discretion. To the contrary, her equitable 
perspective is complicated by her professional position, whereas the lay decision maker is free 
to make moral judgments with fresh eyes that are unclouded by institutional incentives and 
biases. 
Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 332; see also Josh Bowers, Mandatory Life and the 
Death of Equitable Discretion, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 39 
(Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012) (“More than the professional, the layperson has the 
capacity and inclination to cut through the thicket of legal and institutional norms . . . to the equitable 
question of blameworthiness . . . .”).  
20 On moral particularism, see JONATHAN DANCY, ETHICS WITHOUT PRINCIPLES 1 (2004); infra 
notes 53–60 and accompanying text. 
21 Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 342 (“[W]hen it comes to the enforcement of 
public-order crimes, equitable evaluation plays the more robust role.”); see also infra notes 68, 75–107 
and accompanying text. 
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introduce a set of proposals for normative juries. I explain that at least 
some of these reforms are viable under current resource constraints. 
Moreover, they remain consistent with our original understanding of (and 
aspirations for) popular participation in criminal justice. 
The proposed reforms are ambitious, to be sure. And I am not 
convinced that we ought to adopt all of them. But some experimentation is 
warranted. To the extent a significant stumbling block remains, it is a lack 
of will more than impracticality. The institution of the full-dress jury trial is 
just too deeply engrained in our ideas and ideals about criminal justice. 
And the Sixth Amendment is largely responsible for entrenching those 
ideas and ideals. The paradox is this: the legalistic jury underserves our 
constitutional aspirations, but its very existence saps energy from viable 
reform. 
I. THE HISTORICAL JURY
At the Founding, substantive and procedural criminal law looked 
remarkably different. There was no professional police force. Laymen often 
prosecuted cases. Grand and trial juries played principal (even dominant) 
roles.22 And, because premodern juries were unencumbered by structured 
criminal codes (and, for that matter, top-heavy rules of criminal procedure 
and evidence), these juries were authorized to make normative decisions 
about whom to charge and convict.23 Grand juries did more to initiate 
charges. And these charges—statutory or otherwise—were structured less 
and open more to interpretation by trial juries.24 At bottom, criminal law 
was less about “applying a particular set of rules” than “keeping the peace” 
22 Cf. Stephanos Bibas, Transparency & Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
911, 918–19 (2006) (discussing the historical prevalence of jury trials); Bowers, Normative Grand 
Juries, supra note 2, at 323–29 (discussing historical influence of grand juries); Lawrence M. Friedman, 
Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 247, 257 (1979) (noting that “the 
rise of professional police and full-time prosecutors . . . put an end” to any time where “full-scale trial 
by jury was the norm”); John Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 261, 262–65 (1979) (noting the historical evolution of the jury trial). 
23 Cf. RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 64 (4th ed. 2016) 
(explaining that, at common law, “the body of rules that define[d] the elements of crimes[] had little 
meaning, since juries could decide what the law was on an ad hoc basis”); Bowers, Mandatory Life, 
supra note 19, at 28 (“[I]t was the jury’s duty to declare the law’s meaning, and, when the jury shaped 
the law according to a particularistic moral evaluation, the jury was just doing its job. . . . It was not 
until much later that this robust and legitimate exercise of jury power was recast as unlawful 
nullification.”). 
24 As I have examined elsewhere, the historical grand jury played an especially powerful equitable 
role. Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 329–43; see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand 
Jury Discussion and Constitutional Design, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 703, 706 (2008) (“[T]he grand jury 
was never designed as a mere sounding board to test the sufficiency of evidence . . . .”). 
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through “a communal legal culture” that “depended on the presence and 
participation of people in local communities.”25 
Deep factual questions of motive and character were integral because 
contemporary concepts of mens rea had not yet crystalized. Instead, the 
operative measure of criminal culpability was “general moral 
blameworthiness.”26 The aim, as one nineteenth-century legal scholar put it, 
was to appeal to the juror’s “downright common sense, unsophisticated by 
too much learning,” a mode of evaluation in which jurors engaged 
independent of formal trial rules of evidence and procedure.27 Unlike today, 
the prevailing model was neither due process nor crime control, but a 
“summary process” model,28 whereby the jury sought “to do justice 
between the parties not by any quirks of the law . . . but by common sense 
as between man and man.”29  
The historical approach was neither optimal nor ideal. Too much 
moral reasoning and too little law can lead to criminal justice that is far 
from egalitarian.30 But the pendulum has swung hard to the opposite pole. 
25 Jessica K. Lowe, Book Review, A Separate Peace? The Politics of Localized Law in the Post-
Revolutionary Era, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 788, 793 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). See 
generally STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012) (describing historical shift 
to professionalized criminal justice). 
26 Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 994 (1932); see also JEFFREY
ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 31 (1994) (“[J]urors 
generally had effective power to control the content of the province’s substantive law.” (quoting 
WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON 
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 29 (1975))); JOHN HOSTETTLER, THE CRIMINAL JURY OLD 
AND NEW: JURY POWER FROM EARLY TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY 41 (2004) (describing how the jury 
“reflected the interests of the local community as opposed to those of central authorities”); Bowers, 
Mandatory Life, supra note 19, at 28 (“[A] given amorphous mens rea term typically operated as little 
more than an arbitrary symbol into which decision-makers could pour the meaning they felt appropriate 
for the case at hand.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
27 Edward P. Wilder, Trial of Issues of Fact—Jury v. Judges, 13 W. JURIST 391, 395 (1879). 
28 Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 359. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Plea 
Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 (1979) (observing that historical “rapid trials” 
have been replaced by “cumbersome and expensive” modern jury trials); Herbert L. Packer, Two 
Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964) (describing the due process and crime-
control models of criminal process). 
29 William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall’s Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 910 (1978) (quoting GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 297 (1969)); see also id. (explaining that eighteenth-century juries 
were considered to be “good judges of the common law of the land” (quoting Letter from James 
Sullivan to Elbridge Gerry (Dec. 25, 1779) (on file with Massachusetts Historical Society))). Consider 
this grand jury instruction from 1759—that prospective charges “need[ed] no Explanation [since] your 
Good Sence & understanding will Direct ye as to them.” NELSON, supra note 26, at 26 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
30 But cf. infra notes 45–50 and accompanying text (indicating the manner by which localism and a 
balance of institutional authority and power may promote consistency and limit caprice).  
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Substantive and procedural law has hardened into the set of casts we 
recognize today. Whereas historical juries were arbiters of law and fact,31 
modern juries are no longer authorized to shape law to accommodate even 
the most compelling equitable circumstances. To the contrary, juries must 
accept the law as judges give it. As the Supreme Court explained in Sparf 
v. United States:
[I]t is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court and
apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence. Upon the
court rests the responsibility of declaring the law, upon the jury, the
responsibility of applying the law so declared . . . .32
Moreover, the legal instructions that judges now give are 
comparatively precise. Trial judges use pattern instructions to avoid sloppy 
orders that may open convictions to appeals.33 Over the past century, 
American criminal justice has come to reject almost entirely common law 
criminality and likewise vague or otherwise open-ended statutes.34 
We may call this transition the legality turn. It arose out of a perceived 
“especial need for certainty” in criminal law.35 Louis Michael Seidman has 
pointed to it to explain why “formalism continues to dominate criminal 
jurisprudence” even though “realism’s lessons for criminal law seem 
obvious.”36 The idea is that the exceptional stakes of criminal justice entail 
special protections—protections that rigid rules better provide.37 Premodern 
31 Supra notes 22–29 and accompanying text.  
32 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895). 
33 Paul Marcus, Judges Talking to Jurors in Criminal Cases: Why U.S. Judges Do It So Differently 
from Just About Everyone Else, 30 AZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 60–62 (2013). 
34 HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 86–87 (1968) (describing 
development of the legality principle and concluding that “after centuries of retrospective law-making 
by judges . . . the process of judicial law-making in the criminal field has . . . come to a halt” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
35 Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent, and the Common Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 215, 256 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jeremy Waldron, How Law Protects 
Dignity, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 200, 217 (2012) (observing that the rule of law is especially important to 
criminal justice because “its currency is ultimately life and death, prosperity and ruin, freedom and 
imprisonment”); Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 37 (1974) 
(discussing criminal law’s long tradition of “strict adherence to rules”). 
36 Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of Criminal Law 
and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97, 103 (1996); cf. Egon Bittner, The Police on 
Skid-Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 AM. SOC. REV. 699, 700 (1967) (“[C]rime belongs wholly to 
the law, and its treatment is exhaustively based on considerations of legality . . . .”). 
37 See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 12, at 988–95 (examining and critiquing the 
prevailing perspective); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal 
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 201 (1985) (explaining that “appeals to the ‘rule of law’” as they apply to 
the penal law tend to entail “the resort to legal formalism as a constraint against unbridled discretion”); 
cf. Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different from All Other Rights?, 
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 821 (1994) (explaining that criminal justice is different in kind from other 
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criminal justice was considered just too formless to adequately protect 
against official acts of caprice or abuse. 
But there are tradeoffs and underappreciated costs. Grand juries have 
become comparatively useless puppets of the state.38 And the influence of 
trial juries has been replaced by the technocratic expertise of the 
professional administrator (to wit, the charging and bargaining 
prosecutor).39 She alone typically decides whom to charge and when to 
initiate a bargain. And mandatory sentencing law has magnified her 
leverage to compel guilty pleas. Lay trial jurors are left with little work to 
do. And what little work remains is mostly formal application of fixed law 
to fact. Equitable discretion is not absent from such a system. No system 
can or should eliminate equitable discretion entirely.40 But the executive 
agent is generally the only actor authorized to work the equitable levers. 
Equitable power has been made the province of the prosecutor. It is hers to 
bestow—if it is to be bestowed at all.41 
Setting aside, for present purposes, the question of whether this 
aggregation of equitable discretion is bad or good, the descriptive points 
remain: even though jury practice has evolved significantly since the 
Founding, our aspirations for the institution have remained largely 
unchanged. The Supreme Court has continued to celebrate the “common-
 
forms of legal regulation and that “liberty from confinement cannot be relegated to the status of 
unprotected aspects of daily life”). Elsewhere, I have devoted considerable space to the claim that—at 
least in some circumstances—a supplemental procedural and comparatively evaluative conception of 
the rule of law could constrain the state better than a wholly formal approach. A procedural model 
would provide even technically guilty individuals with meaningful opportunities to tell their stories and 
demand understanding. Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 12, at 996–98; Bowers, Annoy No Cop, 
supra note 14; see also infra notes 53–60 and accompanying text. All the same, I readily concede that 
the legality turn has proven more good than bad. 
38 See Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 328 (discussing trope that the modern 
grand jury would “indict a ham sandwich”); William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 178 (1973) (arguing that the modern grand jury “operates as a sounding 
board for the predetermined conclusions of the prosecuting official”). 
39 See Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1660, 1706–12; Bowers, Mandatory Life, supra note 
19, at 25, 34–36; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Mercy’s Decline and Administrative Law’s Ascendance, 
in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 666 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009) (characterizing the shift in 
power from juries to prosecutors as a product of “a widespread belief in the administrative sphere that 
there were right answers to be found by professionals with training and expertise”). 
40 See Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 340 (“[B]ias and discrimination are 
endemic to any discretionary system. . . . [T]he immediate choice is not between a proposed 
discretionary regime and a preexisting determinate . . . regime; it is the choice about who may exercise 
equitable discretion . . . .”); see also Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 329, 347 (2007) (“[A]ll of these concerns are legitimate but far from fatal. Discrimination,
arbitrariness, and variations in temperament, eloquence, and attractiveness are endemic problems in
criminal justice. Remorse, apology, and forgiveness are at least neutral metrics and criteria to structure
and guide discretion.”). 
41 See Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1660, 1706–12. 
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sense” of the jury over “the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic 
reaction of the single judge.”42 Even Chief Justice William Rehnquist once 
commented that the lay juror’s “very inexperience is an asset because it 
secures a fresh perception . . . , avoiding the stereotypes said to infect the 
judicial eye.”43 In other words, we have grown to prize the very notions of 
equity that informed our original understanding of the jury, even as we 
have neutered the body with an ever more legalistic trial structure and 
substance. Today, the institution often fulfills its aspirational role through 
subterfuge only, by nullifying law or otherwise operating extralegally.44 
II. COMPLETE JUSTICE
No stakeholder should wield equitable power exclusively. And there 
are particular reasons to be wary about leaving this power to the 
professional American prosecutor. Expansive criminal codes and draconian 
mandatory sentencing laws make it just too tempting for prosecutors to 
make guilty pleas the price of equitable punishment. Defendants who insist 
on exercising trial rights are threatened thereafter with trial penalties.45 In 
such circumstances, a popular body may provide a popular buffer between 
the prosecutor and her incentives. A healthy dose of localism and populism 
may serve to moderate otherwise draconian enforcement decisions and to 
generate meaningful attention to (and affective understanding of) the 
particulars of particular cases.46 On this logic, efforts to experiment 
42 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968); see id. at 157 (“[W]hen juries differ with the 
result at which the judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are serving some of the very 
purposes for which they were created and for which they are now employed.”); Williams v. Florida, 
399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (explaining that the value of the jury “lies in the interposition between the 
accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen”); see also Louisiana v. 
Taylor, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (discussing the need for a representative jury to “guard against the 
exercise of arbitrary power”); State v. Pelham, 824 A.2d 1082, 1095 (N.J. 2003) (Albin, J., dissenting) 
(“[J]urors, through their collective experience and humanity, are the conscience of the community . . . 
[and] the best means of delivering justice.”). 
43 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 355 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
44 See Bowers, Mandatory Life, supra note 19, at 33–36; supra notes 31–37 and accompanying 
text. 
45 See Josh Bowers, Plea Bargaining’s Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1083 (2016) 
(examining coercion theory as applied to plea bargain practice). 
46 Bill Stuntz has traced harsh modern penal policies to a lack of localism in criminal justice. 
William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1974 (2008) (“[For t]he detached 
managers of urban criminal justice systems . . . criminal justice policies are mostly political symbols or 
legal abstractions, not questions the answers to which define neighborhood life. Decisionmakers who 
neither reap the benefit of good decisions nor bear the cost of bad ones tend to make bad ones.”); id. at 
2033 (noting that in the “sphere of governance, equality and local democracy go hand in hand”); see 
also Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Forward: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. 
L.J. 1153, 1168 (1998) (arguing that there is “no basis . . . to presume that [criminal justice
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democratically serve as means more than ends—means to temper and 
abolish contextually official opportunities for coercive conduct and harsh 
treatment.47 
It is no accident that Martha Nussbaum has defined the practice of 
equity in criminal justice as “a gentle art of particular perception, a temper 
of mind that refuses to demand retribution without understanding the whole 
story.”48 Equitable discretion typically goes hand in hand with merciful 
treatment and a capacity to appreciate and accept claims of normative 
innocence.49 That is my aim—to create noncoercive conditions whereby 
even a legally guilty offender might be able to articulate his story in an 
effort to cultivate understanding and, possibly, mitigation.50 But what are 
these conditions? In the first instance, we need unstructured standards to 
“complement[]” legality’s conventionally rule-bound baselines.51 Beyond 
that, we need an audience willing and able to hear and comprehend the 
stories that unstructured standards invite.52 And this is where laypeople 
come in. 
My orientation, then, is not so much with radical democrats or even 
civic republicans but with rule skeptics (think, for instance, philosophical 
anarchists or virtue theorists).53 I do not prize popular participation qua 
professionals] are better situated than the members of [local] communities to determine . . . a reasonable 
trade off between liberty and order”); cf. ABRAMSON, supra note 26, at 18 (“[L]ocal knowledge . . . 
qualifies the juror[s] to understand the facts of the case and to pass judgment in ways that a stranger . . . 
could not . . . . [T]hey know the conscience of the community and can apply the law in ways that 
resonate with the community’s moral values and common sense.”). 
47 See Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 324 (discussing the concept of a lay 
screen, such as a grand jury, as “more of a quasi-legislative body than an executive or judicial 
body[,] . . . a grassroots political [institution] . . . that serves to reshape the rough edges of the law in a 
decidedly populist fashion”). 
48 Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 92 (1993). 
49 See Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1678–86 (describing strands of equitable discretion). 
50 See Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 55–56 (2008) 
(describing the adjudicatory practice of “offering both sides an opportunity to be heard” to be one of the 
“elementary features of natural justice”). 
51 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1221 (2010) (“[R]ules without clear methods of application may require 
standards as complements . . . .”). 
52 Infra notes 61–67 and accompanying text (discussing the capacities and experiential wisdom of 
laypeople, and describing the manner by which unstructured standards invite moral deliberation). 
53 Compare DANCY, supra note 20, at 1 (expressing the strong particularist account that “moral 
judgment can get along perfectly well without any appeal to” generally applicable rules), and supra 
note 48 and accompanying text (quoting Martha Nussbaum, a proponent of virtue ethics), and infra note 
64 and accompanying text (quoting Lawrence Solum, another proponent of virtue ethics), with Heather 
K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1748 (2005) (advocating disaggregated
democratic institutions as a means to empower political minorities and distribute participatory
experiences among citizens), and Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice 111 NW.
U. L. REV. 1367 (2017) (discussing philosophies of radical democrats and civic republicans).
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participation. Rather, I simply reject our overreliance upon rules.54 There 
are overlaps, of course, between the democratic experimentalist and the 
rule skeptic. Compare, for instance, Jeremy Waldron, who celebrates 
citizens as “active centers of intelligence,”55 with Seana Shiffrin, who 
likewise emphasizes popular “moral deliberation.”56 Both thinkers 
recognize the “virtue of standards” and “evaluative ideal.”57 But Shiffrin is 
more concerned with the manner by which “opaque” and “evaluative” 
standards might promote the objectives of democratic experimentalism by 
“empower[ing] citizens” and fostering “robust democratic engagement with 
law.”58 For Waldron, however, the causal arrows flow the other way. He 
favors popular participation principally because it is the most likely means 
to produce moral deliberation and a quality of moral argument integral to 
“[t]he procedural aspect of the Rule of Law.”59 It is Waldron’s “richer 
conception” of the rule of law to which I am committed—a conception that 
stands in “tension” with the dominant formalistic conception of the legality 
principle and its overarching “ideal of formal predictability.”60 
Laypeople are uniquely well suited to evaluate normative principles, 
like fairness, dignity, autonomy, mercy, forgiveness, coercion, and even 
equality.61 More to the point, laypeople are particularly good at desert 
judgments. Questions of proportionality, blameworthiness, and social 
responsibility are ultimately normative and evaluative, more than legal and 
analytic.62 And I am far from alone in this assessment.63 The Aristotelian 
54 See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 12, at 1025 (discussing the rules–standards debate 
and resisting the criminal justice system’s prevailing emphasis on rules); Bowers, Annoy No Cop, supra 
note 14 (same); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 227 (1984). 
55 Waldron, supra note 50, at 59. 
56 Shiffrin, supra note 51, at 1222. 
57 Id. at 1222, 1240 (“[O]ne virtue of standards is that their lack of precision induces moral 
deliberation . . . .”); Waldron, supra note 50, at 12 (“[W]e need to understand the facts of political life 
and the reality of the way in which power is being exercised before we can deploy the Rule of Law as 
an evaluative ideal.”). 
58 Shiffrin, supra note 51, at 1214, 1218, 1227, 1240 (endorsing the “virtues of fog” as a means to 
promote “deliberation and conversation on the ground, redounding to the moral health of both citizens 
and a democratic polity”). 
59 Waldron, supra note 50, at 5, 59 (“I do not think that a conception of law or a conception of the 
Rule of Law that sidelines the importance of argumentation can really do justice to the value we place 
on governments to treat ordinary citizens with respect as active centers of intelligence.”). 
60 Id. at 8, 58; see also id. at 5 (“[O]ur understanding of the Rule of Law should emphasize not only 
the value of settled, determinate rules and the predictability that such rules make possible, but also the 
importance of the procedural and argumentative aspects of legal practice.”); Bowers, Annoy No Cop, 
supra note 14. 
61 Infra notes 62–67 and accompanying text. 
62 As I argued previously: 
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view is that human interactions are not captured well by rules.64 Moreover, 
social science has shown that “lay judgments about core wrongdoing are 
intuitional.”65 For the layperson, “the common concerns of life” are more 
important that any mechanistic measure.66 These are the same common 
concerns that courts continue to credit—consciously or otherwise—
whenever they champion “the good sense of a jury.”67 
[T]he full measure of moral blameworthiness is to be found in neither code nor casebook, court
nor classroom. It is the product of neither executive nor judicial pronouncement. To the
contrary, it arises out of the exercise of human intuition and practical reason, applied concretely
to the particular offender and his act.
Josh Bowers, Blame by Proxy: Political Retributivism & Its Problems, A Response to Dan Markel, 
1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 135, 136 (2012); see  also Stephanos Bibas, Political Versus Administrative Justice, 
in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 39, at 677 (“Deferring to government officials makes 
sense when they possess technocratic expertise . . . . [C]riminal justice policy is much more about lay 
moral intuitions than about apolitical expertise.”); Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1674 (arguing 
that “a more particularistic focus on an actor’s blameworthy conduct better accounts for common moral 
intuitions” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Jeremy Waldron, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment: The Words Themselves, 23 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 269, 284 (2010) (describing a jurisprudential 
approach that accommodates a more or less “shared sense among us of how one person responds as a 
human to another human”). 
63 See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1445 (1995) 
(observing that an evaluation of moral blameworthiness involves an exercise of “practical judgment”); 
Kyron Huigens, The Jurisprudence of Punishment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1793, 1820 (2007) 
(“[D]esert for legal punishment is informal and particularistic.”); Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy, and 
Craziness, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 1493 (1984) (explaining that proportionality provides no “invariant[ 
or] objective deserved punishment for each offensive act”); see also RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL LAW 12 (4th ed. 2015) (explaining that, according to some commentators, “one of the 
strengths of retributive theory is its sensitivity to contemporary community morality”). 
64 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 133 (David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed. 
1988) (“[A]bout some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct. In 
those cases, then, in which it is necessary to speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly, the 
law takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error.”); Lawrence B. Solum, 
Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 206 (2003) 
(“[T]he infinite variety and complexity of particular fact situations outruns our capacity to formulate 
general rules.”); cf. Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (“[P]roblems are not 
solved by the strict application of an inflexible formula. Rather, their solution calls for the exercise of 
judgment.”). 
65 Paul H. Robinson, Reply, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 39, at 62. 
66 State v. Schoenwald, 31 Mo. 147, 155 (1860); see also Bibas, supra note 22, at 914, 931 (noting 
that “[lay] [o]utsiders . . . focus on . . . offenders’ just deserts” and “care about a much wider array of 
justice concerns than do lawyers, including . . . blameworthiness, and apologies”); Bowers, Blame by 
Proxy, supra note 62, at 143 (“[R]etributive valuation relies upon particularized exercise of practical 
intuition and intelligence, not on formal legal designations.
 
It requires a contextualized commonsense 
determination that is sensitive to all relevant circumstances.” (internal quotations marks and footnotes 
omitted)). 
67 State v. Williams, 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 248, 259 (1855) (emphasis omitted) (discussing “the good 
sense of a jury . . . that . . . take[s] a common sense view of every question”); see also supra notes 26–
29 and accompanying text (citing and quoting contemporary sources); cf. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
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But, of course, the layperson’s talents are not boundless. The pertinent 
question, then, is when popular perspective adds value or virtue and when 
it does not. This is why I remain opposed to (or, at least, deeply agnostic 
about) trial jury nullification. The practice may serve as a needed corrective 
to a particular normative injustice. But the law is left sullied. As I once 
observed: “Equitable discretion is necessary and proper, but it also should 
be kept in its proper place. Trials should remain principally about legal 
questions; by contrast, other adjudicatory stages—arrest, charge, bargain, 
and sentence—can appropriately accommodate exercises of equitable 
discretion.”68 
At trial, I remain committed to the dominant conception of the 
principle of legality. Formalism fits well with the modern criminal trial and 
the adjudication of legal guilt. And this is precisely why popular 
participation no longer fits so comfortably there. That is to say, trials have 
changed, but moral reasoning has not. What the Michigan Supreme Court 
wrote in 1874 is equally true today—that lay jurors are “not likely to get 
into the habit of disregarding any circumstances of fact, or of forcing cases 
into rigid forms and arbitrary classes.”69 
By contrast, legal professionals do much better at trial. They tend—as 
a matter of temperament and training—to sort cases analytically into 
predetermined categories, boxes, and types.70 This form of reasoning is 
over- and underinclusive and thereby somewhat fictive.71 But it produces its 
own kind of accuracy—formal guilt accuracy.72 In other words, when the 
lawyer “generalizes, and reduces everything to an artificial system, formed 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 61–62 (1766) (observing that “established rules and fixed 
precepts” have the capacity to destroy equity’s “very essence” by “reducing it to a positive law”). 
68 Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1685; see also Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra 
note 2, at 338 (explaining that trial nullification problematically “renders law a subjective manifestation 
of what the community believes it to be”). See generally Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury 
Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253 (1996) (examining the practice of jury nullification as a threat to the 
rule of law). 
69 Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173, 190 (1874). 
70 Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 12, at 1048 (“[T]he lawyer is—by training, experience, 
and culture—more inclined to categorize and less inclined to contextualize. To think like a lawyer 
means to give one’s self over to a mythology of formalism . . . driven by the internal and ineluctable 
logic of the law. It means pretending that . . . decisions are strictly rule-governed, whether they are or 
not.” (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted)); see also Dennis Jacobs, Lecture, The Secret 
Life of Judges, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2855, 2859 (2007) (“[J]udges have a bias in favor of legalism and 
the legal profession . . . . It is a matter of like calling unto like.”). 
71 See Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1691 (discussing the manner by which formal rules 
may “substitute hollow make-believe for life in fact”); Bowers, Mandatory Life, supra note 19, at 36 
(“[T]rained professionals typically develop heuristics that may frustrate adequate contextualization.”). 
72 Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 12, at 1019–21. 
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by study,” she is just doing her job.73 For this reason, some scholars have 
suggested that trials should be bench.74 According to this view, technical 
legal questions should be left to the trained professionals. 
And I am inclined to agree—provided that some space is left for 
evaluations of normative accuracy. My position is that there are, in fact, 
two forms of accuracy: legal accuracy and normative accuracy.75 A legally 
accurate determination attends to the rules. A normatively accurate 
determination attends to the particulars. Both forms of accuracy demand 
transparent attention in a system committed to Waldron’s “richer 
conception” of the rule of law—which I have termed complete justice.76 
The trick is only to determine how to harness each stakeholder’s respective 
talents. There is a balance to strike; as Douglas Litowitz once remarked: 
“[B]oth insider and outsider perspectives have an important role to play in 
any comprehensive account of law . . . . [O]utside and insider perspectives 
can mediate each other . . . . The goal is to play multiple perspectives 
against each other in a kind of hermeneutic conversation . . . .”77 This 
73 State v. Williams, 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 248, 259 (1855). See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW 
AND IN LIFE (1991) (describing rule-bound reasoning as the craft of the lawyer). 
74 See, e.g., Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 328; Campbell, supra note 38, at 
178; Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. 
REV. 260, 294 (1995) (arguing that trained magistrates are better suited than grand jurors to answer 
legal question of whether probable cause exists for charge); Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand 
Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 45 (2002) 
(arguing that “grand jurors are inherently unqualified to perform [the] statutory duty” of “evaluat[ing] 
whether or not there is sufficient evidence to establish reasonable cause that the defendant committed a 
crime”). 
75 Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 12, at 1019–21 (describing two conceptions of 
accuracy). 
76 Waldron, supra note 50, at 58; see Nussbaum, supra note 48, at 93, 96 (“Equity may be regarded 
as a ‘correcting’ and ‘completing’ of legal justice. . . . The point of the rule of law is to bring us as close 
as possible to what equity would discern in a variety of cases . . . . But no such rules can be precise or 
sensitive enough, and when they have manifestly erred, it is justice itself, not a departure from justice, 
to use equity’s flexible standard.”); Waldron, supra note 35, at 212 (arguing that exclusive attention to 
“the clarity and determinacy of rules . . . is to slice in half, to truncate, what law and legality rest 
upon”); see also Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 330 (“[C]omplete justice requires 
law tempered by equity, lest it become, in Blackstone’s terms, ‘hard and disagreeable.’” (quoting 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 67, at 62)); Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1672 (“Complete justice 
demands both the simple justice that arises from fair and virtuous treatment and the legal justice that 
arises from the application of legal rules.”); cf. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two 
Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 373–74 (1996) (“It’s when the law 
falsely denies its evaluative underpinnings that it is most likely to be incoherent and inconsistent.”); 
Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 154 
(1997) (arguing that “[t]he moralizing that occurs with . . . criminal law” is “on balance a good thing” 
and “probably inevitable in any event” but that it ought to be done “openly”). 
77 Douglas E. Litowitz, Franz Kafka’s Outsider Jurisprudence, 27 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 103, 132–33 
(2002). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1670 
principle of allocating responsibility according to respective competency is 
basic to good governance.78 
But there is no real balance of power in modern American criminal 
justice. To the contrary, the authority and power of the modern American 
prosecutor make abuses of discretion and arbitrary treatment almost 
inevitable.79 As Bill Stuntz explained: “[W]hen prosecutors have enormous 
discretionary power, giving other decisionmakers discretion promotes 
consistency, not arbitrariness. Discretion limits discretion; institutional 
competition curbs excess and abuse.”80 Particularly when it comes to petty 
order-maintenance cases, we need “a division of labor”—a partial 
“outsourcing of equitable discretion from the professional actors who 
currently possess almost all such power to the lay actors who currently 
possess almost none.”81 These low-level cases are the very cases where 
some measure of equitable discretion is anticipated.82 Yet these are likewise 
the cases where police and prosecutors tend to underexercise equitable 
discretion, yielding instead to their own institutional incentives and 
cognitive biases, which motivate them to arrest, charge, and bargain 
reflexively.83 
78 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF 
LAW, at lx (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958) (“In a 
government . . . each organ has a special competence or expertise, and the key to good government 
is . . . figuring out which institutions should be making which decisions and how all the institutions 
should interrelate.”); Bibas, supra note 62, at 677 (“Deferring to government officials makes sense 
when they possess technocratic expertise.”); Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1676 (“By 
embracing case-specific equitable valuation, the system is not any less consistent per se (even if the 
inevitable inconsistencies are more apparent); in fact, such a system may even be more consistent and 
less arbitrary, especially where normative judgments are made by locally responsive and comparatively 
more transparent lay collectives.”). 
79 See Bowers, Mandatory Life, supra note 19, at 35 (“[T]he risk of abuse of equitable discretion is 
endemic—as is the risk of abuse across human endeavors. . . . The risk of abuse merely underscores the 
need for conscientious institutional and legal design intended to express and cabin equitable discretion 
optimally.”); Margareth Etienne, In Need of a Theory of Mitigation, in CRIMINAL LAW 
CONVERSATIONS, supra note 39, at 631 (“[T]o leave these hard [normative] questions in the hands of 
any one institutional actor—the judge, jury (or commonly, the prosecutor)—is to leave that group 
susceptible to accusations of caprice and lawlessness.”). 
80 Stuntz, supra note 46, at 2039. 
81 Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 359. 
82 See id. at 327 (“[T]here exists something of a disconnect. Most lay and professional stakeholders 
already agree that suspected murderers, rapists, and robbers almost always ought to be charged where 
probable cause exists to support such charges. However, reasonable minds may, and often do, disagree 
about optimal or fair levels of (or strategies for) enforcement of petty public-order offenses.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
83 See Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1660, 1701–02 (examining prosecutorial incentives to 
charge); Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 12, at 1000, 1008 (examining police incentives to 
arrest). 
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The notion of exporting trial juries might strike the reader as radical. 
And it is. But that only goes to show the tremendous hold the constitutional 
right has on our popular imagination. The Sixth Amendment casts a long 
shadow. It has flipped the institution upside-down and stuck the jury in its 
awkward place, relegating it to only resource-intensive full-dress trials.84 
Juries are misplaced—procedurally and substantively. They answer the 
wrong types of questions at the wrong stages, adjudicating only formal 
guilt in the wrong types of cases. Consequently, they are left to play no 
meaningful role in the borderline cases that raise the most significant 
normative questions.85 
III. NORMATIVE JURIES
We should not be too hopeful about prospects for radical jury reform. 
Reform is likely to remain impossible as long as the Sixth Amendment 
occupies the field, sapping all efforts to critically reconceive of what it 
means to be a “circuitbreaker in the State’s machinery of justice.”86 All the 
same, I have in mind five proposals—one of which I have already 
described elsewhere in great detail, and four of which I will just sketch 
lightly now. These are, essentially, five sites where a lay body might better 
serve our aspirational hopes for the institution. 
First, I have outlined a proposal for a normative grand jury, which 
would presume probable cause and proceed directly to the normative 
question of whether a prospective charge was morally or prudentially 
warranted.87 I even described a practical means—involving summary 
proceedings comparable to brief bail hearings—by which we might extend 
these normative grand juries also to the kinds of petty cases for which 
equitable screens are most sorely needed.88 Defense attorneys would 
84 See Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 323–324, 327; supra notes 31–41, 44 and 
accompanying text. 
85 See Deborah Ramirez, Affirmative Jury Selection: A Proposal to Advance Both the Deliberative 
Ideal and Jury Diversity, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161, 166 (explaining that it is “in those close cases 
where . . . different perspectives . . . can generate results that are different”). A number of grand jury 
proponents have made a version of this point. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 74, at 23 (observing that 
“[t]he true power of the grand jury . . . manifests itself in the marginal cases . . . [where] the defendant 
has a . . . sympathetic story to tell”); id. at 44, 50 (observing that juries are likelier to play equitable 
roles in “cases on the margins”). 
86 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004). 
87 Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 347–49. 
88 Id. Notably, this would be no great deviation from historical practice, when grand juries not only 
exercised normative influence, but also commonly considered trivial misdeeds that would probably 
constitute misdemeanors today. Leipold, supra note 74, at 283 n.120 (“Early grand juries might accuse 
individuals of offenses such as . . . excessive frivolity, . . . failing to grind corn properly and ‘giving 
short measure’ when selling beer.”); see also Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 324–25 
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endeavor briefly—through a narrative recitation of equitable considerations 
specific to the offender or the offense—to convince the normative grand 
jury not to issue one, some, or all charges. And, because the normative 
questions are nontechnical, the grand jury could do its work with little 
instruction. 
To be sure, the normative grand jury would look quite different than 
the positive model. But, notably, some jurisdictions experiment already 
with grand jury proceedings that allow for defendant and defense 
participation.89 More to the point, the normative grand jury would exercise 
a kind of latitude widely considered permissible.90 Charging is meant to be 
a discretionary exercise. Indeed, this is precisely why some commentators 
have rejected the pejorative label of so-called “grand jury nullification.”91 
Their claim is that equitable charging discretion is not only institutionally 
acceptable but welcome and anticipated.92 As Roger Fairfax explained, the 
grand jury was never meant to be “a mere probable cause filter.”93 
Second, we could imagine a normative sentencing jury. Indeed, 
several scholars have done so already.94 Moreover, positive models exist 
for such a body: not only do some states rely upon sentencing juries in run-
of-the-mill felony cases, but also a normative jury is constitutionally 
required in capital cases at the sentencing phase.95 Previously, I proposed 
(discussing historical cases in which grand juries refused to indict for equitable reasons, 
notwithstanding obvious legal guilt). 
89 Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 344–45. 
90 Id. 
91 Fairfax, supra note 24, at 708 n.10 (“The term ‘grand jury nullification’ is somewhat of a 
misnomer . . . . [T]he term . . . does not capture the essence of the enterprise of the grand jury’s exercise 
of discretion . . . and unfairly yokes grand jury discretion with petit jury nullification . . . .” (citations 
omitted)); Simmons, supra note 74, at 48 (“The term ‘grand jury nullification’ is . . . a misnomer 
because it equates the grand juror’s proper exercise of discretionary judgment with a trial juror’s 
improper decision to acquit those whom have been proven guilty.”); see also Niki Kuckes, The 
Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional Function of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 1265, 1269 n.19 (2006) (“[J]ury nullification . . . criticisms do not readily apply to grand juries,
which have the valid power to decline prosecution even on meritorious criminal charges.”). 
92 See Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1662–69. In then-Judge Warren Burger’s words, the 
prosecutor “is expected to exercise discretion and common sense.” Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 
479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
93 Fairfax, supra note 24, at 720. 
94 For arguments in favor of jury sentencing, see Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury 
Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951 (2003); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. 
L. REV. 311 (2003); Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775 (1999); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Implementing Blakely,
17 FED. SENT’G REP. 106, 111 (2004) (“Greater jury involvement in sentencing ensures that sentences
do not stray too far from popular understandings of blameworthiness and fairness.”).
95 See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284 (2004) (noting that a defendant is entitled to frame 
arguments for mitigation “in the most expansive terms”); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) 
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extending the equitable capital model to prospective sentences of life 
without parole.96 We could extend a lite version of the same to all different 
kinds of cases, including even misdemeanors. Of course, we would need 
first to overhaul our mandatory sentencing laws (a heavy lift, beyond the 
scope of this project). But if we could achieve substantive sentencing 
reform, then the procedural reform—the normative sentencing jury—might 
be an attractive next step. After all, equitable discretion fits more 
comfortably with our objectives for sentencing anyway.97 In any event, 
misdemeanor sentencing is typically discretionary already. 
My last three proposals are a bit more ambitious and a bit less 
conventional. I remain unconvinced that they are even viable. But that 
should not keep us from experimenting cautiously. The first idea is a 
normative plea jury.98 Especially in low-level cases, plea negotiations 
resemble the kinds of everyday exchanges—sometimes heated, sometimes 
cordial—that laypeople experience and understand. As Malcolm Feeley 
observed in his famous examination of misdemeanor justice in practice, 
these negotiations tend to have more to do with “fleshing out . . . the setting 
and circumstances of the incident . . . [and] the defendant’s background” 
than the legal merits of the pending charges.99 
(requiring a jury to find aggravating factors necessary to impose death sentence); Payne v. Tennessee, 
501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991) (“[V]irtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital 
defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances . . . .”); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 
(1978) (observing that the capital sentencing body is allowed to consider “as a mitigating factor, any 
aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the 
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death” (emphasis omitted)); see also Bowers, 
Mandatory Life, supra note 19, at 25. 
96 Bowers, Mandatory Life, supra note 19, at 39 (“[T]he layperson has the capacity and inclination 
to cut through the thicket of legal and institutional norms (that are not the layperson’s stock in trade) to 
the equitable question of blameworthiness that is and ought to be central to the sentencing 
determination.”). 
97 See DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 1 
(1990) (noting that punishment falls short of societal expectations because “we have tried to convert a 
deeply social issue into a technical task for specialist institutions”). Thus, Dan Kahan and Martha 
Nussbaum endorsed a two-step approach to criminal procedure, distinguishing the legalistic conviction 
phase from the more appropriately equitable sentencing phase: 
In determining an offender’s guilt or innocence . . . the law evaluates her actions, . . . and at that 
point, the law . . . is ordinarily unconcerned with how the defendant came to be the way she is. 
But during the sentencing process, the law has traditionally permitted the story of the 
defendant’s character-formation to come before the judge or jury in all its narrative 
complexity . . . . 
Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 76, at 368. 
98 On the possibility of plea juries, see Laura I Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731 (2010). 
99 MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER 
CRIMINAL COURT 179 (1979). Similarly, Milton Heumann recorded verbatim the very kinds of cursory 
(yet consequential arguments) that a defense lawyer might make to a normative plea jury, particularly in 
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Next, there might even be possibilities for a normative bail jury. Bail 
proceedings are commonly both substantively meaningful and brief. When 
we ask how these proceedings can be both at once, we get to the equitable 
heart of the matter. It is because the practices of arguing for and against 
bail have less in common with trial advocacy than with the narrative form 
of short storytelling—a paradigmatic exercise of particularism.100 The 
conventional bail argument entails an oral exercise that would be 
comprehensible to the layperson without much legal guidance for the 
simple reason that there is not much law to apply. 
If nothing else, the use of a bail jury might reduce the frequency with 
which prosecutors ask for bail in borderline misdemeanor cases. This 
practice of setting so-called “nuisance” bail—typically, no more than a few 
hundred dollars—may be tantamount to remand for indigent defendants.101 
In this way, a bail jury could be a procedural mechanism for effecting 
sorely needed substantive bail reform.102 
Finally, and perhaps most provocatively, we could create a Fourth 
Amendment jury. In a pair of recent articles, I have endorsed a qualitative 
conception of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, which would limit the 
authority of the state, at suppression hearings, from relying exclusively 
upon comparatively rule-like quantitative measures of guilt, like probable 
cause. Instead, defendants would be able to argue, at least in some 
circumstances, that a search or seizure—even if legally supported—was 
nevertheless equitably unreasonable (or “generally unreasonable”) and 
a low-level case. MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, 
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 40 (1977) (“[H]ere’s a nice kid . . . he’s a college kid.”); id. at 109 
(“Now look. He’s an old guy. He’s sixty-two years old, how about six months?”); id. at 151 (“Army 
backgrounds, both with tremendous records in the service, all kinds of citations and everything else, 
fully employed, good family backgrounds, no criminal records . . . . These men shouldn’t have felony 
records for the rest of their lives.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Josh Bowers, Punishing 
the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (2008) (describing equitable plea negotiations); Ronald Wright 
& Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 38 (2002) (“[T]he 
compromise outcome allows the prosecutor to respond to the equities in particular cases.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
100 See Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 347 (“[T]he bail determination relies on a 
holistic understanding of the contextualized factual circumstances of the alleged incident and the 
contextualized social circumstances of the alleged offender.”); cf. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE’S 
KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 110–15 (1992) (describing the novelist as a 
particularist). 
101 See Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, supra note 99, at 1135–36 (discussing the prevalence of 
nuisance bail and citing statistics). 
102 For sources and resources on bail reform, see Bail Reform: A Curated Collection of Links, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 30, 2017, 7:09 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/records/1439-bail-
reform#.lVConomrv [https://perma.cc/J7SJ-MMQX]. 
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therefore unconstitutional.103 In this way, a court could use an evaluative 
standard to cultivate understanding of the unique perspective of the suspect 
or defendant—an affective form of meaningful understanding largely 
missing from prevailing doctrine. As Paul Robinson and I have examined, 
lay perspectives on reasonable police conduct tend to diverge—sometimes 
radically—from the professional perspectives of judges and justices.104 
There are exceptions, of course—cases in which judges may bring lay 
wisdom to bear. Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s thoughtful and probing dissent 
in Utah v. Strieff comes to mind.105 Likewise, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court recently sought to understand—with reference to a scathing ACLU 
report—innocent reasons why a young African-American man might run 
from Boston police in a high-crime neighborhood.106 These judges strove to 
put aside their professional training, experiences, biases, and perspectives 
and do what laypeople do intuitively—to think and reason normatively. But 
these exceptions are rare. Most judges tend toward the professional 
approach—formalism over flexibility. 
Rather than hope for the exceptional judge, it would be wiser to just 
let the unexceptional lay body do the equitable work. Thus, we should 
consider relocating the jury from its awkward home at trial to those 
procedural stages where laypeople might do the normative job more 
comfortably and less controversially. 
CONCLUSION 
My overarching objective—indeed, the animating notion behind my 
entire research agenda to date—is not to cultivate popular participation in 
103 Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 12, at 1019; Bowers, Annoy No Cop, supra note 14. It 
would be fair to describe the immediate proposal as a form of “popular constitutionalism.” See 
generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (arguing for forms of popular constitutional review and enforcement). 
104 Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and 
Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 226 (2012) 
(“Courts may endorse ostensible reasonable beliefs that the reasonable public does not, in fact, share—
that the public, instead, perceives to be either too deferential to the criminal class or, conversely, 
insufficiently protective of [the privacy of] any citizen (save for the very paranoid).”); see also Dan M. 
Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive 
Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 888 (2009). 
105 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069, 2071 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Although many Americans 
have been stopped for speeding or jaywalking, few may realize how degrading a stop can be when the 
officer is looking for more . . . . We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely 
targeted by police are ‘isolated.’ They are the canaries in the coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal, 
warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere.”). 
106 Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342 & n.13 (Mass. 2016). Contra Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) (holding that officers had reasonable suspicion where an 
individual fled “[h]eadlong” at the sight of police in a high-crime neighborhood). 
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criminal justice, but to reconceptualize what we think of as guilt in the first 
instance. Legal guilt is but one metric—the trial metric. Normative guilt is 
another. To my thinking, a wrongful normative penalty may be every bit as 
abhorrent as a wrongful legal conviction.107 To minimize legal errors, I am 
content to leave convictions and acquittals to professional experts. To 
minimize normative errors, I invite reforms designed to cultivate common 
sense and human flourishing—to let the layperson do what comes natural, 
which is the nontechnical business of equitable discretion. 
107 Bowers, Annoy No Cop, supra note 14 (manuscript at 66) (“The rule of lenity, the presumption 
of innocence, the Double Jeopardy clause—these and many other procedural protections—are all liberal 
devices designed to correct (and even overcorrect) for potentially arbitrary errors that could harm the 
individual. And the costs of error extend likewise to moral arbitrariness.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Peter 
Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal 
Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1018 (1980) (discussing the liberal principle that “it is ultimately 
better to err in favor of nullification than against it”). 
